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Shapley Value And Disadvantageous Monopoly
Abstract
The implication seemed to be that the Shapley value would be significant in accounting for monopoly power if
it turned out that the Shapley value turned up no disadvantageous monopolies. The examples of [4, 7] lend
credence to this expectation, [7] in a production context, [4] in an exchange context. There it turned out that
in a large economy monopoly, as appraised by the Shapley value, definitely was advantageous. The major result
of this paper is that, when these examples are generalized, it is no longer necessary that every monopoly
conceivable in a given situation have a higher Shapley value than its competitive counterpart. In accounting
for monopoly power, the Shapley value appears to have a limited success.
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In his discussion of the phenomenon of core and disadvantageous monopoly
[1] Aumann remarked.
It Is known that the Shapley value is significant in some
economic contexts, and it may well turn out to be significant in
accounting for monopoly power as well.
The implication seemed to be that the Shapley value would be significant
in accounting for monopoly power if it turned out that the Shapley value
turned up no disadvantageous monopolies. The examples of [4, 7] lend credence
to this expectation, [7] in a production context, [4] in an exchange context.
There it turned out that in a large economy monopoly, as appraised by the
Shapley value, definitely was advantageous. The major result of this paper
is that, when these examples are generalized, it is no longer necessary
that every monopoly conceivable in a given situation have a higher Shapley
value than its competitive counterpart. In accounting for monopoly po.wer,
the Shapley value appears to have a limited success.
The paper then runs as follows. The next section sets out a two?-
sector, two-class model, with the feature that either or both classes may
form monopoly combinations. The production interpretation of [2, 4] is
retained. Competitive equilibrium is computed in section 3. In section
4, the coalition production games and Shapley values resulting from
various states of competition are discussed. Proved in section 5 are
the major results of the paper. In any situation, at least one monopoly
must be advantageous. Sufficient conditions are given for monopoly on
the part of a particular class to be advantageous. Here are also presented
two counterexamples to advantageous monopoly; one for each side of the
market. The Shapley value by itself is no guarantee of advantageous
monopoly. A parametric example of some interest is considered in section
6. Section 7 briefly summarizes the paper.
2, Economic Model
The agents of the economy are represented by the measure space (N, 5, L)
where N =» [0, 2], S is the class of admissible coalition^ and L is Lebesgue
measure. Every admissible coalition is nieasurable; what coalitions are
admitted depends on the economic situation. There are two classes of agents
In the economy. Agents of class R, the resource holders, each have an
Initial endowment x of good x, w^iose only role in the economy is as an input
in the production process. The resource holders have no productive capabil-
ity. Agents of class P, the producers, have control of the production
technology, here represented by a real-valued production function f(x).
Members of the producing class have no initial endowment of the productive
resource.
We make the economy productive by assuming:
X > 0
(1)
f(0) ^ 0, f > 0. f" < 0.
All agents in the economy desire the produced good; thus it acts as a
medium for imputation in the economy.
We normalize the economy by assuming:
(2) L(P) = L(R) = 1.
Thus, producers and resource holders have the same weight in the economy.
Also, we Introduce the vector measure y, = , gk2) defined by:
lij^(S) - L(R n S)
(3) for any S e S.
tl2(S) - L(P n S)
measures the percentage of all resource holders in a coalition S;
the percentage of all producers in coalition S.
Different states of competition are represented in the model by
different classes of admissible coalitions. Competition is perfect when
every Lebesgue measurable coalition is admissible. We shall hereafter denote
perfect competition by S. In perfect competition, the vector measure y,
is non-atomic. Apart from perfect competition, we distinguish three
cases of imperfect competition, A resource monopoly situation, denoted
exists in the event that
= jS e S: S> Ror y,^(S) = 0],
In a situation of resource monopoly, all the resource holders have com
bined to form an atom, and. they come to market as an indivisible trading
bloc.
Aproducer monopoly situation, denoted 5p, exists in the event that
Sp = is e 5: S > P or - O],
In this situation, all the producers have combined to form an atom, and
come to market as an indivisible trading bloc. Finally, if both combina
tions form, the market situation is one of bilateral monopoly, -Sgp-
this case, the admiss-ible coalitions are simply given by
= !0, R, P, N|.
3. Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we compute the economic solution of the model when
competition is perfect. For further details, the reader is directed to
[3, § 32],







where x(s)ds is the amount of resource allocated to a small producer ds and
x(s)ds is the amount of resource with which a small resource holder ds is
endowed. Since, there are no atoms, one can make agents as small as one
likes. In light of the two class nature of the economy, and the normaliza
tion condition (2), the allocation problem becomes
x(s)ds
max f(x(s))ds
s. t. x(s)ds £ x(s)ds = X
P
Clearly from (1), the unique maximum is obtained by allocating the
scarce resource by the rule x(s) = x. This leads to the economic output
f(x)ds = f(x). Having taken output price implicitly equal to me, the
economic distribution problem is solved by finding the market clearing
resource price. This, of course, is the marginal product of the resource,
Summarizing the competitive equilibrium solution then, x f*(x) is
imputed to the resource class R, and the remaiixJer of f(x) is imputed to
the producer class P. The former imputation we shall call the competitive
resource bill; the latter, the competitive profit bill.
Presumably the motive behind forming a monopoly is to enjoy a superior
market position. In the present setting, this superiority should show up
as an imputation higher than that under perfect competition. Given the
traditional theory of monopoly [5], it is easy to show that monopoly is
never disadvantageous in this sense. However, as Auman [1] has pointed
out, the traditional theory assumes that the monopoly enjoys a strategic
advantage, namely, its price-setting ability. If one no longer assumes
this strategic advantage, then it is no longer clear that monopoly should
invariably be advantageous. First, however, we must see what dropping
the strategic advantage of monopoly entails.
4. Cooperative Games and the Shapley Value
Suppose a monopolist comes to market with a take-it-or-leave^-it offer
for his buyers. This then is his fixed threat, and if the buyers have no
counter-threat available, they are indeed in his hands. We shall allow
for the possibility that the situation is more equal strategically, by
positing a counter-threat strategy of "striking". Take the case where
producer monopoly forms and the monopoly makes its- final offer to buyers
in the product market. Then we allow those buyers, who are in fact the
resource holders, to counter with a threat to strike, thereby bringing
the production process to a halt. Ori the other hand, if a resource monopoly
forms in the factor market, a lockout threat is available to producers.
Coupled with'this notion of fixed threat is the fact that a single economic
good is being produce^. Uius, if one allows unrestricted side-payments to be
paid in this good, the economic situation corresponds to a von Neumann-
Morgenstern cooperative game. The characteristic function, of this game,
v(s) is given by
V (S ) : max f(x(s))ds
S
s.t. x(8)ds £ x(s)ds
In economic terras, v(s) says that a coalition always takes the strike threat
of the counter-coalition N - S seriously, and only counts on what it can
produce by itself.
By reasoning entirely analogous to that for solving competitive
equilibrium, v(S) takes the form'
v(S) f (xp,^(s)/^i2(s)) when p,^(s) > 0, > 0
0 otherwise.
In particular, neither class is productive without the other.
Previous game-theoretic studies [1, 8, 9] of this model have dealt
mainly with the core. The major positive result [9] is' that, in the
von Neumann-Morgenstern case, no core imputation is disadvantageous to the
monopolist; but is Is also known [1] that some core Imputations may be
disadvantageous when side-payments are disallowed.
In this paper, following Aumann's suggestion, we seek results for
the case when monopoly power is measured by the Shapley value.
Denote by cp(S) the Shapley value of coalition S. We are interested
mainly in cp(R) and cp(P), in each of the form competitive situations S,
5p, and Denote by cp(R; 5) the Shapley value of the resource class
in situation S, and so forth. For the situation immediate implica-
KF
tion of the axioms for cp[l, Appendix A] is that
(5) cp(R; = (p(P; \p) = f(5)/2.
The axiomatic and asymptotic values cp for the situation are shown in
[3] to equal the competitive imputations; thus
cp(R; S ) = X f' (x)
(6)
cp(P; S ) = f (x) - X f' (x)
For situations 5^^ and S^, Hart [6], has shown the existence of uncountably
many axiomatic values, but in these cases the asymptotic value is still unique.
The asymptotic values we require are given by
cp(R, =J 1^2 f(x/p,2)dU2
(7)
.1 _
ep(P, Sp) = f(xp,^)dp,j^
These formulas correspond to spreading the monopoly atom uniformly over
the unmonopolized sector. Since the asymptotic value is Pareto efficient, (7)
Implies that the remainder of the output f(x) is distributed among the unmonopo
lized sector. Pareto efficiency here has the further implication that, unlike
in the traditional model, the monopoly does not gain its power by sabotaging
the price system. Rather, it gains its power by preserving the perfectly
competitive allocation of resources and distorting the perfectly competitive
distribution of the product. This latter distortion is reflected by the
process of averaging marginal contributions that takes place in (7).
5. Advantageous and Disadvantageous Monopolies
In this section, we investigate the phenomenon of advantageous monopoly
from the standpoint of the Shapley value, A producer monopoly is advantageous
relative to its competitive counterpart if and only if cp(P; 5^) > cp(P; 5).
Using (6) and (7), this implies
_(8) ' f(x t).dt > f(x) - X f*(x)
0
10
In this casej the value of the monopoly is clearly an improvement upon that of,
its competitive counterpart. Likewise, a resource monopoly is advantageous
relative to its competitive counterpart if and only if cp(R, 5^) > tp(R, S);
which is to say
pl
(9) t f'(x/t)dt > X f»(x).
0
A basic result is the following:
Theorem 1. At least one^ monopoly is advantageous.
Proof, Suppose not. Then adding (8) and (9)
••pi
I f(x t) + t f(x/t) dt ^ f(x)
0
Note that the integrand equals 2f(x) at t = 1 and 0 at t « 0. Thus, to exhibit
the desired contradiction it is enough to show that the integrand is a concave,
increasing function of t. The first derivative of the integrand is given by ,
f(x t - (x t f'(x t ^) + Xf'(x t), which is positive since the total
product is greater then the wage bill The second derivative, given by
-2 - -3 -X [f"(x t) + t f"(x/t)], is clearly negative, by virtue of the concavity of f.
Given that at least one monopoly is advantageous, the next task is to find
conditions under which a given monopoly is advantageous.
Theorem 2. (a) If the competitive wage bill is an increasing function of
endowment^ producer monopoly is advantageous, (b) If the competitive profit
bill is greater than the competitive wage bill, resource monopoly is advantageous
Proof. • (a) Integrating (8) by parts and rearranging -
pi _ _ _ _ .
(x t) f'(x t)dt < X f'(x).
0
The limit of the integrand as t approaches one is simply the right hand side,
and the hypothesis assures us that the integrand increases.
. 11 ,
(b) Integrating (9) by parts and rearranging
a
f(x) - X f*(x) > X f'(x) - X f'(x/t)dt
0
The integral on the right hand side is positive; so if
f(x) - X f(x) > X f(x)
resource monopoly is surely advantageous.
Considering the strength of the hypotheses for advantageous monopolies,
it is natural to ask whether there are disadvantageous monopolies. Indeed,
using the above results, examples of these are not hard to find. We bring two
examples of disadvantage, one for each side of the market.
Example 1, Disadvantageous Producer Monopoly.
Let f(x) = 1 - e . For x > 1, the competitive wage bill decreases.
For x> 1.7 producer monopoly is disadvantageous. Calculations at x = 2,
for instance, reveals that the value of the producer monopoly is .568, whereas
the competitive imputation of the producer class is .594.
Example 2. Disadvantageous Resource Monopoly.
Let f(x) = log(x + 1). For x < 4, the competitive wage bill is greater
than the profits bill, and the competitive wage share approaches 1 as x
approaches 0. Resource monopoly is disadvantageous when x < 1. Thus,
calculation at x = .5 reveals that the value of the resource monopoly = .273,
whereas the competitive imputation of the resource class is .333.
One should note that in both cases, monopoly only becomes disadvantageous
in rather extreme situations. In the example of disadvantageous producer
monopoly, when the disadvantage sets in the competitive share of producers in
the economy is already 62.5% and rapidly increasing with x. In the case of
disadvantageous resource monopoly, when disadvantage sets in the resource
12
share is already 737o and steadily increasing as x falls. One does not appear
to find disadvantageous monopolies in cases where the competitive shares are
roughly equal,
6. A Parametric Example
A stronger result than Theorem 1 is obtained in the case when
f (x) = x^, 0 < a < 1.
From (4), the characteristic function is
v(S) =
The competitive resource bill = a x ; the competitive profits bill = (1 - a)x
From (7), the values of the respective monopolies are
1
cd(R; ^p) = j t ^ dt = x®/ (2 - a)
cp(P; S ) = I* t^ dt = x^/(l + a)
^ 0
Resource monopoly is advantageous, since (2 - a) ^> a for 0 < a < 1;
producer monopoly is also advantageous since (1 + a)"^ > 1 - a for 0 < a < 1.
The advantage to producer monopoly follows from Theorem 2; the advantage to
resource monopoly is rather more surprising. This is a case then where both
monopolies are advantageous. A state of perfect competition is vulnerable to
monopolizing forces on both sides of the market.
A further implication of this example may be mentioned. Suppose one
attempts to estimate the technological parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production
function f(K, L) = K L from data on factor shares generated by such an
economy. Except in the unlikely event of persistent perfect competition.
13
such a production function is misspecified. In the presence of resource
monopoly, the estimate of a is biased upward; in the presence of producer
monopoly, the estimate of a is biased downward. When both monopolies are
present, the bias can go either way.
7. Conclusion
The question this paper ultimately faces is whether the Shapley value
is indeed significant in accounting for monopoly power. Theorem 1 seems a
minimum requirement in that direction, but apparently a stronger result is not
to be had. The intuition that monopoly, when facing passive demand, is inexo
rably advantageous seems to preclude any weaker result. In that case, one must
ask why--excepting legal considerations—there aren't more monopolies. On the
other hand, to say that the success or failure of any given monopoly depends
upon the available technology and factor endowment may not be very exciting,
but is may also be nearer the mark.
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